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The Use of False DNA Evidence to Gain a Confession
During Interrogation is Classic Coercion: Why Such
Coerced Confessions Should Not be Admissible in a
Criminal Trial
Andrea Reed'
INTRODUCTION
In October, 1992, five black teenagers were arrested and subsequently confessed
to brutally assaulting and murdering a fourteen-year-old girl. Years later, DNA
evidence proved these young men innocent. Today, these men are still in jail for
crimes they did not commit.2 Despite growing evidence to the contrary, prevailing
theory still dictates that an innocent person will not be convicted of a crime in
America.3 "Like many criminal justice officials, most people appear to believe in
what .. .has [been] labeled 'the myth of psychological interrogation': that an
innocent person will not falsely confess to a serious crime . . . ." This myth
continues to play an integral role in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors, judges,
and jurors alike "place almost blind faith in the evidentiary value of confession
evidence," trying and convicting defendants because the confession-even though
false-is seen as a clear indication of guilt. This remains true even when the
confession is not reliably corroborated, is the result of police misconduct, and
where there exists "compelling evidence of the defendant's factual innocence."6
Unfortunately, the belief that only guilty persons are convicted is wrong.
Innocent people are convicted. Dating back to the 1930s, Edwin Borchard
described sixty-five incidents in which innocent people were wrongfully prosecuted,
convicted, and incarcerated.7 Fifty years later, Michael Radelet and Hugo Bedau
conducted an in-depth study of the causes of wrongful convictions.' In their
'J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 Rashad Robinson, Innocent, But Forced to Confess - To Murder, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22,
2011, 9:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rashad-robinson/dixmoor-five b 929926.html.
' Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N.C. L. REV. 891, 901 (2004).
2Id. at 910.
I d. at 996.
6 Id.
7 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xiii
(1932).
' See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscatriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21,23-24 (1987). See also MICHAEL L. RADELET, ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE:
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 272 (1992) (analyzing an additional one hundred
cases).
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analysis of 350 cases, they found that in forty-nine of those cases, false confessions
directly contributed to the wrongful convictions.
9
The advances in DNA testing and the ability to apply these methods in
criminal justice have played a significant role in studying wrongful convictions and
exonerating innocent people. In 1996, Edward Connors, Thomas Lundregan, Nea
Miller, and Tom McEwen produced a study using DNA to conclusively show the
innocence of twenty-eight wrongfully convicted defendants.1" In this study,
approximately eighteen percent of the convictions involved false confessions or self-
incriminating statements.' Just ten years later, in 2004, 140 innocent people had
been exonerated through the use of DNA evidence. 12 Of those wrongfully
convicted, twenty-five percent involved false confessions.13 As of 2016, 343
innocent people who were wrongly convicted have been exonerated through DNA
evidence.1
4
Both the increased sophistication of DNA testing and its use in the criminal
justice system have permanently transformed the study of wrongful convictions in
America. Perhaps most significantly, the use of DNA testing in post-conviction
cases to establish the factual innocence of wrongfully convicted individuals has led
to the increased belief that "wrongful convictions occur with regular and troubling
frequency in the American criminal justice system, despite our high-minded ideals
and the numerous constitutional rights that are meant to procedurally safeguard the
innocent against wrongful conviction."1 DNA evidence can be and is used to
conclusively establish a person's guilt or innocence. Even more significantly, the
increased focus on DNA evidence in the media through popular television shows,
such as C.S., Bones, and Law & Order, has led to an increased awareness by the
lay person that DNA evidence can be used to establish a person's guilt or
innocence.
As the use of DNA evidence in the criminal justice system increases, how a
court rules on the allowance of falsified evidence to obtain a confession could
significantly impact the criminal trial process. Two main arguments govern the use
of falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession. The first argument is that this
type of interrogation technique should be deemed per se coercion and ruled
inadmissible. The second argument is that using falsified DNA evidence to obtain
9 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 8, at 57-58.10 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFIER TRIAL 12 (1996).
SSee id. at 16-17.
12 Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 905.
13d
14 All Cases: Exoneration by DNA, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/all-
cases/#exonerated-by-dna (last visited Aug. 7, 2016).
" Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 905.
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a confession should just be one of several factors considered in weighing whether
the confession is admissible in a criminal trial.
16
This Note first examines the history of relevant law, explaining how confessions
gained through the use of illegal police activity are involuntary and subsequently
inadmissible. Next, the rationales for prohibiting involuntary confessions are
discussed. In the United States, a jurisdictional split exists concerning the
coerciveness of falsified evidence. This split is explained, with the underlying
justifications on each side of the split expounded. Finally, this Note provides a
comparative analysis between the two main arguments governing the use of
falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession: (1) that using falsified DNA
evidence to obtain a confession should be deemed per se coercion and inadmissible
in criminal cases, or (2) that using falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession
should be just one factor weighed in determining whether the confession is
admissible under a totality of the circumstances test.
This Note concludes that using falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession
is per se coercive, and such a forced admission should be inadmissible in criminal
cases. DNA evidence is more influential than almost any other type of evidence,
therefore the use of fabricated DNA evidence will unduly influence suspects
undergoing interrogation, who-under the Rational Choice Model' 7-will think
that they are going to be found guilty regardless of their actual guilt or innocence
because of the DNA evidence and will therefore confess to a crime in order to stop
the interrogation. Additionally, allowing confessions gained from the use of
fabricated evidence is a slippery slope that can lead to increased public distrust in
the criminal justice system. Consequently, the use of fabricated DNA evidence to
gain a confession violates a defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
Due Process, and such an admission should be deemed per se coercion and
inadmissible in criminal cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Admissibility of Confessions Gained Through Illegal Pohce Activity.
Police cannot use unwarranted coercive tactics to obtain a confession; the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the admission of such
involuntary confessions."8 Confessions are deemed involuntary if the defendant's
will is overcome and his ability for self-determination is critically impaired.19 In
6 See People v. Mays, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219,229-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
17 Rational choice theory has a variety of definitions and uses, but ultimately posits that man will act to
maximize his own best interests. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66
(2000).
" See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960).
19 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).
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determining the voluntariness of a confession, a court looks at the totality of the
circumstances to assess whether the police obtained evidence through objective or
subjective coercion.2" To decide whether a confession is the result of coercion, and
therefore involuntary, the court should look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the police obtained evidence by making credible threats to the
defendant, thereby overbearing his will, to make an unforced confession.21
While the court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
a confession was coerced, the threshold question the court analyzes is whether the
confession took place in the presence or absence of coercive police activity.'
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is
not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."23 Therefore, if there is no coercive police activity, then the
confession is likely admissible.
However, if there is coercive police activity, the next step is to determine
whether the confession was still voluntary. There are three criteria used to
determine voluntariness: "(1) whether the police activity was 'objectively coercive;'
(2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the defendant; and (3) whether the
coercive police activity was the 'crucial motivating factor' behind the defendant's
confession."24 Any statement that was not the product of the defendant's free
choice at that time it was made is deemed to be involuntary as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree "25
In addition to these criteria, the voluntariness of a confession is determined by
examining the conditions of the interrogation. For example, a court will consider
the type and manner of the questioning used by police officers.' For example, if a
suspect confesses because an officer confronts him with incriminating evidence
found in the case, that confession will almost certainly be deemed voluntary
because the officer acted properly. However, if the suspect confesses only after the
officer engages in "police trickery," by, for example, misrepresenting the strength of
evidence against the suspect or pretending to be the suspect's friend in order to
illicit a confession, then the officer arguably acted improperly and the confession
may be challenged as involuntary.2 7
20 See Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991) and Allee v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Ky. 1970)).
21 See id. (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286-88 and Al!ee, 454 S.W. 2d at 341).
22 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
23 Id.
24 Dye v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Henson v. Commonwealth, 20
S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999)).
2' SeeWong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
26 See Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 445-49 (Ky. 1999); McClain v. Commonwealth,
144 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Ky. 1940).
27 8 LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 19:53
(5th ed. 2010).
[Vol. 104
2015-2016] The Use of False DNA Evidence to Gain a 751
Confession is Classic Coercion
Additionally, some states, such as Kentucky, have enacted "anti-sweating
statutes."28 Kentucky's anti-sweating statute states that:
No peace officer, or other person having lawful custody of any person charged
with crime, shall attempt to obtain information from the accused concerning his
connection with or knowledge of crime by plying him with questions, or extort
information to be used against him on his trial by threats or other wrongful
means, nor shall the person having custody of the accused permit any other
person to do so.
29
Finally, a confession may be deemed involuntary under the due process clauses
of either the federal or a state's Constitution if it is "extracted by threats or violence,
obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper
influence.""0 Gaining a confession through the use of falsified DNA evidence most
aptly falls under the category of being secured by improper influence.
Consequently, if a police officer gains a confession using the above-mentioned
illegal tactics, that confession should be deemed coercive and should not be
admissible in a criminal trial. The rationales for prohibiting coerced confessions are
discussed below.
B. Rationales For Prohibiting Involuntary Confessions.
There are several rationales for prohibiting involuntary confessions and
requiring confessions to be obtained properly under the Due Process Clause
voluntariness standard instead. The Supreme Court has suggested three potential
goals behind using this standard: "(1) ensuring that convictions are based on
reliable evidence; (2) deterring improper police conduct; [and] (3) assuring that a
defendant's confession is the product of his free and rational choice."31 In addition
to these objectives, there is a serious concern that false confessions lead to wrongful
convictions.
3 2
The seminal law review article outlining these rationales was published in the
Harvard Law Review in 1966. The following sections draw heavily from this
article.
1. Rehable Evidence--The first rationale for requiring the circumstances
surrounding a confession to meet the Due Process Clause standard is that this
standard will ensure that convictions are based on reliable evidence. Several
28 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 422.110 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.);
see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1955) (referring to § 422.110 as "the
anti-sweating statute").
29 § 422.110 (Westlaw).
People v. McWhorter, 212 P.3d 692, 713 (Cal. 2009).
31 Developments in the Law-Confkssions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 963-64 (1966).
' Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 960.
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Supreme Court cases have cited this rationale when holding confessions
inadmissible.33 For example, in Lyons v. Oklahoma, the Court asserted that '[a]
coerced confession is offensive to basic standards of justice ... because declarations
procured by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt."34
Additionally, in Stein v. New York, the Court stated that "reliance on a coerced
confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession combines the
persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be
illusory and deceptive evidence."
35
2. Deterrence--While ensuring that convictions were based on reliable
evidence seemed to be the main reason for excluding involuntary confessions at
early common law, the Court has also noted that the Due Process Clause standard
can deter police misconduct.3' For example, in Rogers v. Richmond, the police led
suspect to believe they were about to take the suspect's ailing wife into custody for
questioning.37 Even though the reliability of the suspect's confession may not have
been questioned, The Court held that the use of a legal standard that took into
account the "probable truth or falsity" of the confession was "not... permissible ..
. under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."38 Court dictum in
the Rogers case provided that:
[C]onvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are...
the product[s] of coercion ... cannot stand.... not because such confessions are
unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an
underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law. that ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.... .9
By focusing on the police tactics used to obtain a confession rather than on the
likely truthfulness of the confession, the exclusionary rule applied in confession
cases is similar to Fourth Amendment law excluding evidence obtained from an
unlawful search or seizure.' In both instances, the Court is applying the
exclusionary rule to deter police from engaging in "outrageous" or "illegal" behavior.
The rationale is that by not admitting confessions that result from coercion, police
are then incentivized to conduct proper interrogations.41 One perceived benefit of
using police misconduct as the guidepost is that the test is inherently more
33 See generally Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 31, at 964-68 (discussing the
Court's findings on due process and testimonial reliability in several cases).
34 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944).
3s Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
36 See generally Developments in the Law--Confessions, supra note 31, at 968-73 (discussing Supreme
Court cases and opinions concerning the Due Process Clause and police practices).
37 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535-36 (1961).
3s Id. at 543-44.
3 9 Id. at 540-41.
40 Developments in the Law--Confessions, supra note 31, at 969.
41 Id.
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objective because it does not take into account the suspect's state of mind at the
time of the confession.42
The first case applying this technique was Ashcraft v. Tennessee.4' In that case,
the Court held that allowing an interrogation to last thirty-six hours rendered the
confession involuntary, even though the suspect did not seem to be physically or
mentally affected by the length of the interview.' Regardless of the suspect's
subjective well-being, the Court chastised the officers' behavior as "reminiscent of
the tactics used by 'governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained
by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons ....
hold them in secret custody, and wring from them confessions by physical or
mental torture."'45
Additionally, police officers must obey the very laws that they are entrusted to
enforce. As the Court stated in Spano v. New York, "in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.'" For example, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas has suppressed a confession because it was obtained -in
violation of state law.47 In Wilson v. State, a detective fabricated a crime lab report
on his computer and then presented the false document to the suspect.4' The
document stated that Wilson's fingerprints were found on a magazine clip at a
murder scene.49 Wilson confessed eleven minutes after he was presented with the
forged report and told that forensic evidence was infallible.5 °
Wilson moved to suppress his confession, and on appeal argued that the officer
violated Texas statutes prohibiting tampering with evidence and tampering with a
governmental record."' The State argued that the statute prohibiting tampering
with evidence was aimed at preventing individuals from defrauding the government
and did not apply to law enforcement pursuing an investigation.5 2 The court
disagreed, reasoning that, "[i]f police officers were free to manufactuie physical
evidence and fabricate documents to use in interrogating suspects, courts would no
longer be able to routinely rely upon law enforcement or crime-lab reports as being
accurate and reliable."
5 3
42 I.
43 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Developments in the Law--Confessions, supra note 31,
at 969 (identifying Asheraftas the first case applying this technique).
See Developments in the Law--Confessions, supra note 31, at 969.
Id. (quoting Ashcrafi, 322 U.S. at 155).
Id. at 972 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).47 Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
41 Id at 454.
491 d. at 455.
50 See id.
s1 Id at 456-57.
52 Id. at 459.
13 Id. at 463.
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Although deterring police misconduct is a plausible rationale for suppressing
confessions, case law indicates that, in practice, whether or not a confession was
obtained in violation of state law may not matter.14 For example, courts routinely
uphold convictions based on confessions obtained in violation of state law, while
excluding confessions that did not involve the violation of a state statute."5 Instead
of being dispositive, police misconduct that violates a state statute may simply
strengthen the argument that a confession should be suppressed. 6
For example, in finding a confession to be inadmissible in Haynes v.
Washington, the Court held that police violated a state statute by holding a suspect
in solitary detention for sixteen hours.5 7 In holding that the police conduct was
offensive, the Court focused not on the violation of the state statute, but on the
police misconduct itself, stating that "the basic techniques present here-the secret
and incommunicado detention and interrogation-are devices adapted and used to
extort confessions from suspects."58 By relegating mention of the state statute
violation to a footnote in its decision, the Court seemingly relied mostly on
whether police misconduct violate Haynes' due process rights, rather than on
whether it violated a Washington statute.
5 9
3. Free and Rationale Choice-The third rationale for prohibiting
involuntary confessions involves assuring that a defendant's confession is freely and
rationally given.6" To determine this, the Supreme Court has focused on how the
defendant responded psychologically to police pressure exerted during detentions
and interrogations in which the police obtained a confession.61 This approach
assumes that the accused has a constitutionally protected right to freely choose
whether or not to confess.
62
Early Supreme Court cases held that a suspect's choice to confess was free from
unfair pressure as long as it was not obtained from physical or psychological
torture. 3 However, as methods for obtaining confessions have evolved, so has the
law in determining whether the confession gained was requisitely voluntary,64 a
result of a "free and rational" choice. 65 By requiring that a confession be freely
given, the Court is attempting to preserve an individual's fundamental trial rights
54 See Developments in the Law---Confessions, supra note 31, at 972.
55 See id. (comparing Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), with Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963)).
56 See id.
s7 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510 n.7 (1963).
51 d. at 514.
59 Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 31, at 972.
60 See id at 973.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944) (dictum)).
64 Id. (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959)).
65 Id. at 973-74 (citing Mitchell, 322 U.S. at 68).
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from being taken away before the trial even begins. 66 The goal in this case is not
necessarily to deter police misconduct, because the police may not be at fault. 67 For
example, in Townsend v. Sain, the defendant's confession was held inadmissible
because it was elicited after he was given a drug with the properties of a "truth
serum."68 The Court reasoned that it did not matter whether the police knew of
hycosine's truth serum effects or not, because the effects of the drug still prevented
the defendant from confessing of his own volition. Therefore, even if officers act
properly, a confession is still inadmissible if it is not obtained as a free and rational
choice of the suspect.
4. Wrongful Convictions-People who falsely confess after an
interrogation are likely to be wrongfully punished. This happens in two ways. In
the first scenario, an innocent defendant pleads guilty to avoid an anticipated
harsher punishment. In the second scenario, a judge or jury wrongfully convicts the
defendant at trial.69 One survey found that over eighty percent of innocent people
who chose to go to trial were subsequently wrongfully convicted.7 °  These
convictions, which were generally based only on a confession that was subsequently
proven false, indicate "that confession evidence is inherently prejudicial and highly
damaging to a defendant, even if it is the product of coercive interrogation, even if
it is supported by no other evidence, and even if it is ultimately proven false beyond
any reasonable doubt."
71
The rationales for excluding involuntary confessions are important to keep in
mind when determining whether the use of falsified evidence in obtaining
confessions should be considered under the totality of the circumstances test or
whether it should be deemed per se coercive thereby violating the defendant's Due
Process rights and inadmissible. Clearly instances like the one discussed above, in
which false confessions are used to wrongfully convict and incarcerate innocent
people, weigh heavily in favor of prohibiting the use of falsified evidence in
obtaining confessions completely rather than weighing it against a totality of the
circumstances standard.
C. There Is A Jurisdictional Spt Concerning The Coerciveness ofFalsified
Evidence.
Currently, jurisdictions are split as to whether the use of fabricated tangible
evidence is coercive per se or whether it is only a factor to be considered in the
' Id. at 974 (citing Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search ofa Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 313, 321 (1964)).67 Id.
68 _d. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,298 (1963)).
69 Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 960.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 960-61.
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totality of the circumstances. New Jersey has adopted bright-line rules forbidding
the use of false documents in police interrogation.72 Florida adopted its bright-line
rule in response to State v. Cayward, a case in which the police used fabricated
documents that showed results of a scientific test indicating that the defendant left
semen stains on the victim's underwear.7" Although it did not adopt a bright-line
rule, Kentucky recently enacted a rebuttable presumption of coercion when a
defendant can show that the police used falsified documents to induce a
confession.
74
Some states, like Maryland, look at the totality of the circumstances and weigh
the false evidence as one factor. 75 Still other states, such as California, have
repeatedly found that fabricated tangible evidence used to elicit a confession is not
coercive.76 However, all available cases in which California has found falsifying
evidence not to be coercive have involved the authorities informing the suspect of
the false evidence against him, rather than presenting the suspect with hard
tangible evidence.77
While some states have come down on either side of the argument, finding
falsifying tangible evidence to be per se coercive like New Jersey or Florida or
finding it not to be coercive like California, in many states the issue is a matter of
first impression.
II. THE USE OF FALSIFIED DNA EVIDENCE TO OBTAIN A CONFESSION
SHOULD BE DEEMED PER SECOERCION AND RULED INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE
IT VIOLATES A DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit involuntary confessions.
Confessions that are obtained through coercion are found to be involuntary and are
inadmissible at trial. 7' The use of falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession
should be deemed per se coercion for several reasons. First, DNA evidence is more
influential than other evidence. Second, defendants know that DNA evidence is
more influential than other evidence, and when presented with DNA evidence,
7 State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 802 (NJ. 2003).
73 State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
74 Gray v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000374-MR, 2016 WL 673058, at *5 (Ky. Feb. 18, 2016).
" Lincoln v. State, 882 A.2d 944, 950-51, 957 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
76 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 150 P.3d 1224, 1237, 1241-42 (Cal. 2007) (finding that a "Neutron
Proton Negligence Intelligence Test" was a sham, but that its use was not "so coercive that it tended to
produce a statement that was involuntary or unreliable"); People v. Musselwhite, 954 P.2d 475, 489
(Cal. 1998) (suspect confessed after being falsely told that his fingerprints were found, but the court
found that "the circumstances in which the statements were made by the detectives to defendant, as well
as the statements themselves, f[e]ll short of what is required to make out a case of prejudicial
deception").
77 See VINCENT J. O'NEILL, JR., CALIFORNIA CONFESSIONS LAW §1.36 (database updated Dec.
2015).
7 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2016); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
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they are more likely than those not presented with DNA evidence to confess.
Under the Rational Choice Model, defendants will think that they are going to be
found guilty regardless of their actual guilt or innocence based on DNA evidence
and will therefore confess to a crime in order to stop the interrogation. Third, this
type of confession goes against the rationales purported by the Supreme Court that
confessions should be reliable, made free of police misconduct, and the result of the
defendant's free and rational choice. Fourth, allowing confessions based on falsified
DNA evidence is a slippery slope that could lead to severe mistrust in the American
criminal justice system. Fifth, the use of falsified DNA evidence will likely have an
exorbitant negative disparate impact on certain groups such as juveniles, poor
people, and uneducated individuals.
Consequently, because of the above-stated reasons, the use of falsified DNA
evidence to obtain a confession should be deemed per se coercive (and any
subsequent confession should be held inadmissible in a criminal trial), rather than
simply one factor to be weighed under a totality of the circumstances test.
A. Fabricating DNA evidence is more influential than fabricating other types of
evidence because DNA evidence is more influential than almost any other type of
evidence.
Many studies have been conducted on the uses of DNA evidence at trial and
the effects of this use on jurors.79 Three studies conducted on several hundred
undergraduate students and representative jurors by psychologists at the University
of Nevada, Las Vegas and other institutions focused on: (a) the subjects'
perceptions of scientific evidence; (b) the influence of DNA evidence as compared
to other types of evidence; and (c) the limitations of DNA testimony.80 This study
concluded that jurors give unfair weight to DNA evidence presented at trial, as
jurors found DNA evidence to be ninety-five percent accurate and ninety-four
percent persuasive.81
Studies like this lend credence to the statement that "[n]ot all fabricated
documents carry the same weight of authority and have the same influential power
to affect thinking."' For example, in Lincoln v. State, the use of fabricated
documents was deemed not to be coercive because the documents were falsified
handwritten statements instead of "official, scientific, or government documents."'
SSee, e.g., Joel D. Lieberman et.al., Gold versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority and
Limitations ofDNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POLY &L. 27,27-28 (2008).
aoId. at 29-31, 33-34.
'1 See id. at 44, 52; see also id. at 35 (Undergraduate students also found DNA evidence to be highly
accurate and persuasive.).
Lincoln v. State, 882 A.2d 944, 956 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
Id. at 959.
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As such, "[tihey did not create an appearance of authority and relability as would,
for example, DNA tests presented on the stationery ofa police crime laboratory.
Furthermore, unlike in the Cayward case, discussed below, the fabricated
evidence was not the clear impetus for the confession. In Lincoln, the suspect's
demeanor did not change when faced with false evidence, and he did not confess
until he heard his mother's statement implicating him." This difference indicates
the severe impact that the falsification of DNA evidence can have on a defendant
in comparison to the falsification of other evidence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court in State v. Farley also noted the difference
between acceptable police interrogation techniques and fabricating hard evidence.
The Court stated, "[w]e definitely draw a demarcating line between police
deception generally, which does not render a confession involuntary per se, and the
manufacturing of false documents by the police which 'has no place in our criminal
justice system."'86
Both Lincoln and Farley suggest that although falsifying some evidence may be
looked at in the totality of the circumstances view as just one element in
determining whether the confession should be thrown out, falsifying certain types
of evidence, such as DNA evidence, is subject to stricter scrutiny.
B. Under the Rational Choice Model, defendants will think that they are going to
be found guilty regardless of their actual guilt or innocence based on the DNA
evidence and will therefore confess to a crime in order to stop the interrogation.
The Rational Choice Model is a theory that explains the dynamics of false
confessions. This model suggests that when faced with overwhelming evidence, the
innocent suspect may rationally conclude that the costs of his confession are
relatively low because he is likely to be convicted regardless of whether he
confesses.' In her article, Miriam Gohora suggests that suspects will weigh
"against these lowered costs of confession . .. its relatively high benefits; the
suspect may be spared a harsh penalty in the long term, and in the short term the
stress of an interrogation may be ameliorated or truncated."'8
The presence of damning forged tangible evidence-such as fabricated DNA
evidence-may significantly affect the cost-benefit analysis in the Rational Choice
Model. 9 For example, suppose an innocent suspect is being interrogated for a
murder. In the first scenario, the police have no tangible evidence trying the suspect
to the crime scene. In this situation, confessing to the crime would carry a lot of
Id. (emphasis added).
s Id. at 959.
'6 State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 60 n.13 (W. Va. 1994) (citing State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
87 See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: Talse Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the
Legalty ofDeceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 791, 817-19 (2006).
" Id. at 818 (footnote omitted).
89 See id, at 818-19.
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costs and no benefits and the suspect is unlikely to confess. Now imagine the same
innocent suspect is presented with a gun that supposedly has his DNA on it as well
a lab report that says the suspect's DNA was also found at the scene. The Rational
Choice Theory holds that the presence of this overwhelming evidence, even though
it is fabricated, gives this same innocent suspect reason to confess even though he
did not the crime. In this situation, even though the suspect's choice to confess may
be rational, it is still compelled from the falsified evidence rather than resulting
from his guilty conscious. This kind of police coercion makes the defendant's
confession involuntary and admitting such a confession at trial violates the
defendant's Due Process rights.
In State v. Patton, New Jersey cited Caywards proposition that "[i]t may well
be that a suspect is more impressed and thereby more easily induced to confess
when presented with tangible, official-looking reports as opposed to merely being
told that some tests have implicated him."9" The court also drew on language from
a Nevada Supreme Court case concerning the drawbacks to using fabricated
evidence, noting that allowing law enforcement to obtain a confession using
fabricated documents provides police and prosecutors with an investigatory device
"they have little if any need for, but which has great potential for intentional abuse
and inadvertent harm and havoc.""' In both the Nevada case and in Patton, the
courts found that the law should question the reliability of a confession prompted
"by confrontation with ostensibly irrefutable hard scientific evidence, as opposed to
mere oral allegations."92
Similar to the Rational Choice Model is the theory of the CSI Effect. The CSI
Effect suggests that jurors in criminal cases expect DNA evidence to be put on at
trial and hold prosecutors to a higher standard by requiring them to produce this
evidence.93 This implies that jurors find DNA evidence overwhelmingly convincing
and reliable. The CSI Effect can also be applied to suspects undergoing
interrogation. Just as a lay juror finds DNA evidence convincing, so does the
suspect who is confronted with DNA evidence (even false DNA evidence) by
police officers in the interrogation room. When a suspect is presented with such
overwhelming "evidence," he may feel he has no choice but to confess and hope for
a plea bargain, regardless of whether he actually committed the crime. In his mind,
it is more rational to cease the interrogation.
'o State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 794 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (quoting Cayward, 552. So.2d at
974).
91 Id. at 796 (quoting Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996) (Rose, J., dissenting)).
92 Id. at 797 (quoting Bessey, 914 P.2d at 622 (Rose, J., dissenting)).
9' Se, e.g, Coleman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 497, at 1, 3, 2010 WL 3582439, at *6; State v. Jones, 33
So. 3d. 306, 327 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Charles v. State, 997 A.2d. 154, 157 (Md. 2010); Kelly v. State, 6
A.3d. 396, 412 n.15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Seng, 924 N.E.2d. 285, 296-97
(Mass. 2010).
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C. Using fabricated evidence is a slippery slope that can lead to false confessions
and a public distrust in the criminal ustice system.
In addition to these theories that posit that some evidence carries more weight
than other evidence is the suggestion that the use of fabricated DNA evidence may
lead to false confessions and a public distrust in the criminal justice system. Such
reasoning was applied in the Cayward case.9 4 In Cayward, the police showed the
defendant falsified police reports to induce a confession during the course of the
two-hour interrogation.95 In this case, although the defendant was at the
interrogation voluntarily, was not under arrest, and had waived his Miranda rights,
the Florida court still held that "the manufacturing of false documents by police
officials offends our traditional notions of due process of law under both the federal
and state constitutions. The court reasoned that the police should not
"knowingly fabricate tangible documentation or physical evidence" and that doing
so may have many negative consequences in the criminal justice system.97
The Florida court was concerned about several consequences of using fabricated
tangible evidence, including the chance that fabricated documents may accidently
make their way into court as evidence or into the media, the slippery slope that may
follow the court's condoning of forgery of documents, and the loss of public trust in
a police force that can fabricate evidence to elicit confessions.98 Due to these
concerns, the court affirmed the illegality of the fabrication of tangible evidence.99
D. Using falsified DNA evidence will hkely have an inorchnate disparate impact on
marginalized groups of society, thereby increasing the negative impact on these
individuals.
Certain subsets of criminal defendants are more likely to be exposed to police
misconduct and coercion than others. These include juveniles, minorities, indigent
persons, and the uneducated. These groups typically face police coercion because
they are less knowledgeable of the rules surrounding and governing the criminal
justice system and may not be able to afford a lawyer to protect their best interests.
False confessions from members of these groups that stem from police coercion are
subsequently discussed. It seems unfathomable to give police even more power over
these groups by potentially admitting into court confessions obtained through the
use of falsified DNA evidence.
Coercing children to falsely commit to serious crimes they did not commit
should never happen. Unfortunately, it does. One study revealed that seven
9 See State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
91 Id. at 972.
96 Id. at 972, 974.
97 Id. at 974-75.
98 Id.
99 See id.
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children in the population surveyed, all under the age of fourteen, confessed to
crimes they did not commit after being subjected to police interrogations.'00
Among these were a nine-year-old boy who falsely confessed to setting a fire that
destroyed a factory in town, an eleven-year-old boy who falsely confessed to
murdering his elderly neighbor, and a seven-year-old and eight-year-old who
falsely confessed to the joint murder of an eleven-year-old girl.'0 ' The lack of video
evidence from the police interrogations that lead to most of these false confessions
in juvenile cases obscures the specific method used to gain the confession; however,
simply wanting to go home was a prevailing reason given by adolescents for their
confession.10 2
This correlates directly with the Rational Choice Model discussed earlier in this
note, which suggests that when faced with overwhelming evidence, an innocent
suspect may rationally conclude that benefits of confessing outweigh the costs.10 3
These theories are especially relevant when juveniles are charged with adult crimes
and may be overwhelmed by the criminal justice process, most likely do not
understand their rights, and are unable to appreciate the long-term consequences of
falsely confessing, but who readily understand the longing to simply end the
interrogation and go home.
Another group especially vulnerable to the negative effects of allowing the use
of falsified DNA evidence in interrogations is the mentally handicapped.' 4 In
Atkins v. Virinia, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibited the
application of the death penalty to mentally handicapped persons, in part because
these individuals face a special risk of wrongful execution because they are more
likely to confess to crimes they did not commit.0 5 Similarly to the mentally
handicapped, mentally ill individuals are also more likely to confess to crimes they
did not commit, 1 6 also making them more vulnerable to police coercion.
Other groups that are likely to be negatively impacted by allowing police
officers to use falsified DNA evidence during interrogations are the indigent and
uneducated. What members of these groups have in common is that they are
among the least likely to have representation during a police interrogation due to
their inability to afford an attorney and/or their inability to understand their
Miranda rights to have an attorney present. Police officers hold a tremendous
amount of power over suspects during interrogation. To give authorities more
power over such marginalized groups of people-for example, the mentally
handicapped or impoverished persons-by allowing them to present falsified DNA
loojDrizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 963-64.
101 Id.
1o2 Id. at 969.
103 Gohara, supra note 87, at 817.
104 Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 970.
10 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 & n.25 (2002).
'i See Drizin &Leo, supra note 3, at 973.
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evidence to gain confessions is particularly disconcerting. Such ill-gotten
confessions are most definitively the result of coercive police misconduct.
E. Using falsified DNA evidence to obtain a confession should not just be one of
several factors considered in weighing whether the confession comes in, but should
be deemed per se coercive and the resulting confession inadmissible.
Some courts find that using falsified evidence to obtain a confession is not
coercive per se, but is simply part of normal police interrogation techniques, and
thus is just one factor among several in considering whether the confession comes
in. 107 For example, the Supreme Court has refused to find that a defendant, who
confesses after police misrepresented statements made by his codefendant, does so
involuntarily.'O' The Court has also found that a defendant's ignorance that a prior
coerced confession could not be admitted in evidence does not compromise the
voluntariness of his guilty plea.' 9
Similarly, in California v. Beheler, the Court found that a defendant's interview
with the police was not involuntary simply because he was unaware of the potential
adverse consequences of his statements."' In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court stated
that "we have not held that the sine qua non for a knowing and voluntary waiver of
the right to remain silent is a full and complete appreciation of all of the
consequences flowing from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the
case."1
11
Given the Supreme Court's and lower courts' previous holdings that whether
confession evidence should be admitted is based on a totality of the circumstances,
it is reasonable to believe that some courts would not find the use of police
falsifying DNA evidence to obtain a confession to be per se coercive.112 Instead
these courts might rely on previous holdings and use a totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether the confession comes in."3
There are several benefits to using a totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether a confession is admissible in a criminal trial. First, potentially
useful evidence is not automatically excluded. Therefore, a true confession, though
gained through police misconduct, may still be admissible in court. The benefit of
admitting this confession at trial is that a trier of fact hears more evidence on which
to base its 'decision of guilt or innocence. Additionally, if a true confession is
admissible in court, it is more likely to lead to the person who committed the crime
being convicted for the crime. Relatedly, a consequence of deeming all confessions
107 See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
108 Id.
'09 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970).
"o California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 n.3 (1983).
nl Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
112 Cf F14azier, 394 U.S. at 739 (holding that police use of falsified statements did not render a
confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances).113 See id
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gained through the use of falsified DNA evidence as per se coercive is that some
true confessions will not be admissible. Additionally, because confessions play such
a large role in convicting a defendant, not having this confession might result in
some guilty individuals being found innocent.
However, these benefits must be weighed against the consequences of allowing
the use of falsified DNA evidence to be considered in the totality of the
circumstances. On the whole, the consequences far outweigh any potential benefit.
The most severe consequence of using the totality of the circumstances test is that
innocent people may be tricked into making a false confession, and because
confessions are highly regarded in court, those people may be convicted for crimes
they did not commit. The end result is that innocent people wind up spending
years in jail for crimes they did not commit."' It is extremely difficult to overturn a
conviction. Instead, there are "the notions that jury verdicts are sound and [that]
principles of finality and deference should prevail without overwhelming evidence
of innocence."115 Relatedly, prosecutors and investigators may be reluctant to
reopen a case because they believe the right person is behind bars.' 16 Furthermore,
even with new evidence of innocence and a desire to move forward, appeals can be
time consuming and costly. Not everyone has the resources needed to undertake
such an endeavor.
Another consequence of using the totality of the circumstances standard is that
police may turn to creating false documents and breaking the law in order to garner
a confession they could not get through ordinary police interrogation. Additionally,
people will lose trust in the criminal justice system if there is prolonged and prolific
police misconduct."7 As the court stated in Haynes v. Washington, "official
misconduct cannot but breed disrespect for law, as well as for those charged with its
enforcement.""'8
Finally, an approach which finds the fabrication of DNA evidence per se
coercive should be "the test used to determine whether a challenged confession is
voluntary is utterly divorced from the probable veracity of that confession," since
using "coerced confessions is constitutionally objectionable not only due to the
danger that they are false or unreliable but also because the methods used to obtain
them are offensive to some of our society's core values."1 9 Therefore, "the
114 Kimberly Cogdell Boies, Misuse of DNA Evidence is Not Always a 'Harmless Error'. DNA
Evidence, ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Wrongful Conviction, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 403, 428
(2011).115 Id. (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongfil Conviction Law,
2005 WIS. L. REv. 35, 36 (2005)).116 ld.
117 See supra text accompanying note 94.
8 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,519 (1963).
119 Michad D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable Relationship Between an
Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1208
(2010).
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likelihood that the confession is untrue . . . is [not] the sole interest at stake." 2 '
Instead, "the categorical proscription against the use of coerced confessions ...
gives concrete substance to a 'complex of values' that-even today-undergirds this
constitutional stricture, all of which are inextricably intertwined . *...""' In this
instance, it is a combination of the likelihood that the confession is untrue, as well
as the preservation of the individual's freedom and the desire to curb police
misconduct that work together to prohibit the use of involuntary confessions.
1 2
Given these reasons, it is clear that the use of falsified DNA evidence should be
deemed per se coercive and the resulting confession deemed inadmissible in a court
of law. Anything less would be a violation of the defendant's Due Process rights.
CONCLUSION
Summarily, it has long been established that in order to be admitted in a court
of law confessions must be voluntary. Confessions that are deemed involuntary-
because they are unreliable, the result of police misconduct, or not the result of free
and rational thought-are inadmissible. In recent years, with the advancement of
DNA evidence use in trials, more confessions are being obtained. While the use of
DNA evidence at trials can be beneficial for both exonerating the innocent and
putting the guilty behind bars, the use of falsified DNA evidence in obtaining a
confession should be deemed per se coercive and, therefore, the resulting
confession should be inadmissible.
The use of falsified DNA evidence in obtaining confessions has startling
potential negative impacts, the most significant one being the increase of false
confessions among innocent people. This one potential negative impact far
outweighs any benefit that obtaining a confession through falsified DNA evidence
may garner. Falsely convicting innocent people is, in part, what the use of DNA
evidence is intended to protect against. Allowing such confessions to be admitted
in a criminal trial goes against the rationales of voluntary confessions and instead
creates situations in which the suspect's Due Process rights are violated. As
venerable Judge Learned Hand remarked, "Our procedure has been always haunted
by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. "2
Consequently, states should adopt the rule that police use of false DNA evidence to
obtain a confession is per se coercion and subsequently find the resulting confession
inadmissible in a criminal case.
120 Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
121 Id. (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207).
" Seeid (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207).
12 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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